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More than a decade after Watergate, neither Congress nor the federal
courts have developed law that adequately guards against the govern-
ment's ability to cover up its wrongdoing and later escape liability by
pleading the statute of limitations. To determine when the limitations pe-
riod begins to run on claims concealed by the government, federal courts
employ the tolling standard designed to address relations between parties
at arm's length. The government-citizen relationship, however, includes
an element of trust and an imbalance of power and access to information
that are not present in arm's length dealings. Federal tolling doctrine
should be refashioned to reflect that relationship. This Note argues that
courts can do this by analyzing cases alleging government cover-up under
the tolling standard applied to parties between whom there is a special
relationship of trust or confidence.
I. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT
A. The Doctrine
Whenever a party knowingly commits a tort that is self-concealing, or
commits a tort and then covers it up, the party is guilty of fraudulent
concealment.' A self-concealing tort is one which is inherently unknow-
able, or which is part of a larger scheme that includes acts designed to
1. Modern fraudulent concealment doctrine is usually traced back to Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 342 (1875), and Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879), in which the Supreme Court
adopted the doctrine as a matter of federal common law. For a history of how the doctrine has evolved
from the common law, see Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L.
REv. 591 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud], and Dawson, Fraudulent Con-
cealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REv. 875 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Dawson,
Fraudulent Concealment]. A more recent treatment is available in Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment
in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 GEo. L.J. 829 (1983).
At one time the two types of fraudulent concealment were thought of as separate doctrines. Al-
though some courts still make a distinction between self-concealing torts and those that are subse-
quently concealed, see infra note 39, courts and commentators tend to see both types as comprising the
single doctrine of "fraudulent concealment," see, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 33 n.102 (D.C.
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); Marcus, supra, at
870.
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prevent the victim from discovering his cause of action.' In such cases, the
injury or its cause frequently is not apparent to the victim until after the
limitations period has run.' Fraud is the prototypical example, 4 but a
slowly germinating toxic tort5 or even a clandestine effort by law enforce-
ment agencies to discredit anti-war activists would also fit into this cate-
gory. The second type of concealment occurs when a tort is followed by
acts or statements intended to cover up the initial wrongdoing.7 In these
cases, the injury may be apparent, but the cause of action is concealed.
The Army's attempt to cover up the fact that it conducted fatal chemical
warfare experimentation on an unwitting patient is an example of this
type of concealment.'
In these circumstances, a court must decide whether to toll9 the statute
of limitations. As the Supreme Court explained over a century ago, stat-
utes of limitation:
were enacted to prevent frauds . . . . To hold that by concealing a
fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself
until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the
statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was
designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful
and secure.10
2. See Hobson, 737 F.2d at 33-34. In the case of the inherently unknowable tort, some courts
hold that the defendant must demonstrate a "minimum of culpability" by, at the least, "construct[ing]
a scheme which is by its nature unknowable." Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108,
118 n.7 (D. Conn. 1978). See generally Marcus, supra note 1, at 865-70 (discussing self-concealing
torts); Dawson, Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 1 (same).
3. See, e.g., Nitol v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 405, 414 (1985) (injuries from government atomic
testing in Marshall Islands became apparent only after limitations had run); Allen v. United States,
588 F. Supp. 247, 341 (D. Utah 1984) (injuries from government atomic testing in Nevada became
apparent only after limitations period had run).
4. Indeed, at one time the commission of a self-concealing tort was classified as fraudulent con-
cealment only if the concealed cause of action itself was premised on fraud. This approach has been
abandoned. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 867-69.
5. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3.
6. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (federal and local law enforcement
agencies engaged in campaign of wiretapping and disinformation to undermine civil rights and anti-
war groups), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985).
7. See, e.g., Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (government covered up
knowledge that there was no military necessity for West Coast concentration camps during World
War II). See generally Hobson, 737 F.2d at 33-34 (discussing affirmative concealment); Dawson,
Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 1, at 877-82 (same).
8. See Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Cattell v.
Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983).
9. "To suspend or stop temporarily." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1334 (5th ed. 1979).
10. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1875). As a more recent court explained
fraudulent concealment:
In such cases, the underlying policy of the statute of limitations, discouraging litigation of
"stale" claims, does not arise. The claim is not stale. It merely took time to accrue. Genuine
concern about lost evidence, fading memories and the passage of time are subordinated to a
greater concern that legal wrongs be remedied at the first practical opportunity.
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 341 (D. Utah 1984).
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The common law developed two standards for tolling the statute of lim-
itations in cases of fraudulent concealment.11 One standard is applied to
parties at arm's length,12 the other to parties between whom there is a
relationship of trust or confidence.1" Under both standards the defendant's
concealment of material information surrounding his wrongdoing tolls the
limitations period until plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of due dili-
gence should have discovered, the concealed cause of action.1 4 Within that
common framework, however, the two standards are very different. The
arm's length standard takes a much more expansive view of what should
place a plaintiff on notice of his claim, and a much narrower view of what
constitutes concealment. For the plaintiff seeking to toll the limitations
period, the decision of which standard is applied can determine whether
or not he is able to bring his substantive claim in court.
Under the arm's length standard, the diligence of the plaintiff's inquiry
into the existence of a claim is judged according to an objective reasonable
person standard. No allowance is made for any trust plaintiff may have
had in the honesty of defendant's behavior or representations. 5 More im-
portant, the arm's length rules define concealment very narrowly: The
defendant is under no duty to disclose her wrongdoing. Her silence will
not stop the clock from running on an injured plaintiff's cause of action.1
Indeed, the defendant's denial of wrongdoing does not constitute fraudu-
lent concealment, and will not serve to toll the statute of limitations.1
Courts find the arm's length standard too harsh to apply to certain
relationships. In relationships where the concealing party's honesty
or forthrightness is expected or should be encouraged, courts
apply a different standard. 8 Under this "trusted defendant" stan-
11. The Seventh and Second Circuits apply a slight modification of these standards. See infra note
39.
12. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1098 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying
trusted defendant standard); Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (applying
arm's length standard).
15. See, e.g., Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 727-28 (W.D. Mich. 1980), affd, 676
F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 117 n.5 (D. Conn.
1978). See generally Marcus, supra note 1, at 878-82 (discussing objective standard).
16. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 143 (1879); Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rub-
ber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978); Dayco Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 386 F.
Supp. 546, 549 (N.D. Ohio 1974), affd, 523 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1975). See generally Marcus, supra
note 1, at 864-65 (discussing rules governing concealment).
17. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
919 (1982); Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Dayco, 386 F. Supp. at
549. But see Rutledge, 576 F. Supp. at 250 (stating in dictum that denial "may" in certain circum-
stances constitute concealment). See generally Marcus, supra note 1, at 861-64 (discussing denial).
18. See Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 1, at 879 & n.11 (citing cases); Dawson,
Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 1, at 610-14. For a more elaborate discussion of the relationships
which have warranted the different standard, see infra note 22.
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dard,19 the concealing party is under a duty to disclose his wrongdoing to
the plaintiff. His failure to disclose, or his denial of wrongdoing, consti-
tutes fraudulent concealment, tolling the statute of limitations.20 As under
the arm's length standard, the limitations period remains tolled until the
injured party discovers, or in the court's judgment should have discovered,
the concealed cause of action. But in determining when the plaintiff
should have discovered the concealed cause of action, the existence of the
relationship of trust reduces the degree of diligence required of the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff has no duty to mistrust the statements of the trusted
defendant, and may rely on him to disclose all facts material to any
wrongdoing. Thus, the plaintiff is excused from investigating facts that, in
an arm's length relationship, would put him on notice of possible
wrongdoing.21
The relationships that have been found to warrant the trusted defend-
ant standard cannot easily be categorized. While the standard applies to
fiduciary relationships, it also applies to a wide range of relationships that
do not meet that strict legal standard.2" Because the labels courts have
19. There is no formal term for this standard. The relationships that give rise to the standard
have been given many labels. See infra note 22. The term "trusted defendant" seems most descriptive
of the full panoply of relationships to which the standard has been applied.
20. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1098 n.2 (10th Cir. 1984); Canton Lutheran
Church v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873, 878 (D.S.D. 1981); see also
Rutledge, 576 F.2d at 250 (discussing trusted defendant standard). See generally Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1221 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments] (same).
21. See, e.g., Ramsey, 738 F.2d at 1098 n.2; Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540, 550, 305
P.2d 20, 33 (1957).
Application of the trusted defendant standard does not, however, relieve plaintiff of his duty to
make a reasonable investigation; it only affects what the court considers reasonable. See, e.g., Hupp v.
Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1974) (limitations period had run on plaintiff's claim despite
"fiduciary relationship"); see also Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 630 (E.D. Pa.) ("the phrase
'breach of fiduciary duty' is not talismanic, in the presence of which the statute of limitations withers
away"), affd, 612 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1979).
22. See Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 1, at 879 n.11 (citing cases "where the
plaintiff's reliance was justified, not by the 'fiduciary' character of the defendant's obligation inferred
as a matter of law, but by an expectation of good faith known to the other party and abused");
Ramsey, 738 F.2d at 1096 (tolling limitations period in light of "confidential" relationship between
elderly absentee landlord and local real estate broker); Spinelli, Kehiayan-Berkman, S.A. v. Imas
Gruner, A.I.A. & Assoc., 602 F. Supp. 372, 375 (D. Md. 1985) (tolling limitations period in light of
"fiduciary" relationship between managing partners and limited partners); Canton Lutheran Church
v. Sovik, Mathre, Sathrum & Quanbeck, 507 F. Supp. 873, 878 (D.S.D. 1981) (tolling limitations
period in light of relationship of "trust and confidence" between architect and client); Developments,
supra note 20, at 1221 (relationships "of a fiduciary nature" warrant trusted defendant standard).
Perhaps the best exegesis of the relationships to which the trusted defendant standard has been
applied is contained in the Restatements definition of confidential relations:
A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence of the
other and purports to act with the other's interest in mind. A confidential relation may exist
although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely to exist where there is a family
relationship or one of friendship . . ..
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2(b) (1959).
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Government Cover-up
used to describe relationships warranting the standard are not exact23 and
often appear to be attached without sufficient care,24 an understanding of
which relationships warrant the trusted defendant standard is better
gleaned from an analysis of the factors courts have considered relevant
than from the labels they have attached. In general, courts apply the stan-
dard to relationships in which there is trust or confidence between the
parties, 25 where there is an inequality of power between the parties, 26 or
where the concealing party has vastly superior access to information con-
cerning the concealed cause of action.2" Courts have taken note of particu-
lar categories of relationships that are expected to give rise to a duty of
honesty and forthrightness. 2' Those categories, however, while extremely
relevant to the courts' decisions, have not been dispositive. Instead, courts
usually decide which tolling standard to apply on the basis of the sum of
relations between the parties.29
23. See 15A C.J.S. Confidential (1955) 355 (confidential relationships "impossible of exact or
precise definition"); Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduci-
ary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 117,
154-56 (1981) (definition of fiduciary duty varies from state to state).
24. See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 4 (1959) ("the term 'trust' is sometimes used
loosely" giving rise to unjustified range of duties); Coffee, supra note 23, at 141 ("the term 'fiduciary'
can become a substitute for close analysis, a rhetorical flourish to be used in place of a logical distinc-
tion"); see also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., dissenting)
("[t]he words fiduciary duty are no more than a legal conclusion and the legal obligations actually
imposed under that label vary greatly from relationship to relationship"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913
(1983).
25. See, e.g., Ramsey, 738 F.2d at 1097 (tolling statute of limitations in light of elderly absentee
landlord's trust in local real estate broker); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ling, 348 So. 2d 472,
475 (Ala. 1977) (because adversary insurance company had gained plaintiff's confidence, its failure to
tell him that limitations might run on his claim tolled the limitations period). See generally Dawson,
Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 1, at 879 n.l (citing cases).
26. See, e.g., Ramsey, 738 F.2d at 1096 (plaintiff's dependence on defendant is factor in tolling
standard); Baselski v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 535, 540 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(tolling limitations based on plaintiff's relative "unsophistication"). See generally Dawson, Fraudu-
lent Concealment, supra note 1, at 879 ("personal inequality" is factor warranting change in tolling
standard).
27. See, e.g., Ramsey, 738 F.2d at 1097 (tolling limitations in part because defendant was plain-
tiff's only source of information about events surrounding wrongdoing); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Ling, 348 So. 2d 472, 475 (Ala. 1977) (limitations tolled in part because of defendant's "special
and superior knowledge").
28. See, e.g., Spinelli, Kehiayan-Berkman, S.A. v. Imas Gruner, A.I.A. & Assoc., 602 F. Supp.
372, 375 (D. Md. 1985) (managing partners and general partners); Bazelski, 514 F. Supp. at 540
(investor and securities firm).
29. When the formal relationship between the parties suggests that the trusted defendant standard
is applicable, but the facts indicate otherwise, the court will apply the arm's length standard. See, e.g.,
Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285 Ala. 454, 456, 233 So. 2d 465, 467 (Ala. 1970) (arm's length standard
applied in libel suit brought by wife against husband where "trust and affection has vanished from
their relationship").
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B. Government Concealment Under the Arm's Length Standard
Federal courts"0 analyze governments1 cover-up under the arm's length
standard.3 2 The arm's length standard's limitations on what constitutes
concealment does not account for any faith the plaintiff may place in the
honesty of government statements or conduct. Under the arm's length
standard, the government has no duty to inform citizens of the injuries it
30. This discussion will focus on federal fraudulent concealment doctrine. Since the Supreme
Court's 1946 holding that federal fraudulent concealment doctrine is read into "every" federal cause
of action, Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), federal courts have applied federal
fraudulent concealment doctrine to adopted state statutes of limitation as well as to federal statutes of
limitation. See generally Marcus, supra note 1, at 831-33, 839-41 (discussing emergence and extent
of federal fraudulent concealment doctrine). Federal fraudulent concealment doctrine thus applies to
tort suits based on federal causes of action against federal, state and local government and government
officials. This includes suits where a federal limitations period is prescribed in the statute, for exam-
ple, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-80 (1982) (which con-
tains a limitations period at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982)), e.g., Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324,
327 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nor. Cattell v. Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983), and under the
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1982) (which includes a limitations period at 28 U.S.C. 2401(a)
(1982)), e.g., Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In addition, this discussion
will assume that federal courts will continue to apply federal fraudulent concealment doctrine to
adopted state statutes of limitation. Some uncertainty concerning the source of tolling doctrine was
created by Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), and Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980), which together can be read broadly to require federal courts to apply
state tolling doctrine when adopting state statutes of limitation. Nevertheless, federal courts continue
to apply federal fraudulent concealment doctrine to adopted state statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Se-
vier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying federal doctrine to adopted state statute
of limitations in suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)); Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (applying federal doctrine to suit directly under the Constitution); see also Marcus, supra
note 1, at 845-55 (federal courts should continue to apply federal doctrine). But see Vest v. Bossard,
700 F.2d 600, 602-04 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying state law to suit under § 1983).
With respect to any uncertainty over the source of tolling doctrine, it should be noted that the
argument presented here is as applicable to state tolling doctrine as to federal law. Indeed, because
federal doctrine is generally more liberal than state doctrine, see Marcus, supra note 1, at 834-35
n.41, if federal courts began to apply state law to adopted state statutes of limitation there would be
an even more compelling need for the application of the trusted defendant standard to government
concealment.
31. "Government" will refer to federal, state and local governments and government officials.
Fraudulently concealed federal actions against these parties may be tolled according to traditional
tolling principles under the Supreme Court's holding in Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 397, that federal
fraudulent concealment tolling doctrine is read into "every" federal cause of action (without regard to
the identity of the parties). See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discuss-
ing Holmberg); see also supra note 30 (citing cases tolling actions against government).
On two occasions, courts have held that because statutes of limitations governing suits against the
United States are limited waivers of the government's sovereign immunity to which exceptions are to
be strictly construed, fraudulent concealment does not apply. See Hammond v. United States, 388 F.
Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Richter v. United States, 551 F.2d 1177, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977)
(following Hammond without explanation). Both decisions have been superceded. See Gibson v.
United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1986) (superceding Richter); Barrett, 689 F.2d at
330 (superceding Hammond). As Hohri pointed out, courts adopted the doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment long before the middle of the nineteenth century. To hold that the doctrine was not incorpo-
rated into any subsequently enacted federal statute of limitations would do violence to congressional
intent. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 247-48.
32. See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 33-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.
Brennan v. Hobson, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir.




has caused them.33 It may remain silent while the limitations period runs
on their claims.3 4 The limitations period will not be tolled if the govern-
ment denies responsibility-even if it knowingly lies-in response to a
citizen's request for information about his injury. 5 Indeed, one court held
that the government's denial of wrongdoing should have aroused plaintiff's
suspicion and put him on notice of his claim."
Similarly, the arm's length standard's objective due diligence test does
not make allowances for a citizen's trust in government.3 7 Without regard
to whether government concealment might have posed a special bar to
particular plaintiffs, courts have held that plaintiffs failed to exercise suf-
ficient diligence in pursuit of their claims.3" Despite the fact that many of
these decisions are often based on no more than speculation about what
should have put a plaintiff on notice of her claim, 9 some plaintiffs have
33. See Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1981) ("It may well be that the
government was negligent in maintaining and publishing records. However, failure of the government
to ascertain and publish the fact of its negligence is hardly sufficient to constitute fraudulent conceal-
ment."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351, 399 (D.N.J.
1983), affd, 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985); Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003, 1019(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("As to the failure to disclose the government's role in the Freedom Ride in the 1961
action, the law is clear that, in the absence of a fiduciary duty between the parties, mere failure to
disclose the existence of a cause of action does not constitute concealment.").
34. See Hernandez Jimenez v. Colero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 101-02 (1st Cir. 1979); Hauptmann,
570 F. Supp. at 399; Peck, 470 F. Supp. at 1019.
35. See Davis, 642 F.2d at 332; Hauptmann, 570 F. Supp. at 399; Peck, 470 F. Supp. at 1019;
see also Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir.) (rejecting argument that govern-
ment employee's suit to recover for wrongful dismissal in 1950's loyalty security proceeding was tolledby belief that judicial protest would have been futile in the face of government denial and "the tenor
of the times"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 83 (1985).
36. Davis, 642 F.2d at 332 n.10 (government press release and reports denying connection be-
tween government polio vaccine and contraction of polio should have helped to put polio victim on
notice of his claim).
37. See Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying reasonable person stan-
dard in suit alleging government concealment).
38. For example, in Hernandez Jimenez v. Colero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1979), the court
held that plaintiff, a government official fired for political reasons, did not make a diligent search into
the circumstances surrounding his dismissal. The court did not consider that evidence of the political
conspiracy might have been difficult to uncover. The court even went so far as to suggest that the fact
that plaintiff's friend eventually learned of the conspiracy by overhearing a discussion at a celebration
in a village square was evidence of how easily the information could have been obtained. Id. at 102.
See also Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984) (limitations had run on civil rights
action against law enforcement officers because plaintiff should have known his legal rights were
being violated and that he had a right to counsel).
39. It is hard to summarize due diligence decisions. While plaintiffs have been held to have been
put on notice of their claims by newspaper articles they did not necessarily read, see cases cited infra
note 41, other courts have found that plaintiffs may not have been put on notice by massive and
relatively undisguised torts. Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp 304, 307-08 (M.D. Ala. 1974)(rejecting government's motion for summary judgment in suit brought by plaintiff class of formerparticipants in 1940's syphilis study). Circuit courts have simply disagreed with the court below over
whether the concealed information was necessary to put the plaintiff on notice of his claim, compare
Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688, 694 (D.D.C. 1974) with Fitzgerald, 553 F.2d 220, 229(D.C. Cir. 1977); or whether the plaintiff should have been more diligent, compare Hohri v. United
States, 586 F. Supp. 769, 791 (D.D.C. 1984) with Hohri, 782 F.2d 227, 251-55 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
The presence of the government as the defendant only exacerbates a general difficulty the courts
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been barred on the basis of the limited facts available at the pleading
stage.40 One court dismissed a claim alleging constitutional injuries be-
cause of its belief that constructive notice was created by reporting in the
"nation's leading newspapers.""' Where courts have held that plaintiffs
are put on notice of their claims by the mere awareness of their in-
jury-rather than when they know of a particular cause of action against
particular defendants 42-the difficulties facing plaintiffs under the arm's
length standard are exacerbated.43
have experienced applying the objective due diligence test. See generally Marcus, supra note 1, at 899
(courts' "eclectic approach" has made it "impossible to reconcile all the cases"). As a result of this
difficulty and to avoid allowing a defendant to escape solely as a result of the plaintiff's naivete or
laxity, two circuits and one district court in another circuit toll the limitations until the plaintiff's
actual discovery of the cause of action when torts have been affirmatively concealed. See Tomera v.
Gat, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975); Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d
Cir. 1979); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., 574 F. Supp. 781, 788 (N.D. Cal. 1983). This
change in the doctrine has not been followed widely. See, e.g., Cambell v. Upjohn, 676 F.2d 1122,
1127 (6th Cir. 1982) (actual discovery standard "would have the statute tolled indefinitely, while
evidence stales, memories fade and courts and adversaries wait, until the plaintiff at his leisure alleges
actual discovery"); see also Hohri, 782 F.2d at 248 & n.54 (following Campbell, but noting that split
may be "more apparent than real" because active concealment cases have involved such effective con-
cealment that no plaintiff could be expected to uncover wrongdoing).
40. See, e.g., Lee v. Kelley, No. 76-1185, slip op. (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1977) (on motion to dismiss
rejecting plaintiff's argument that government concealment tolled the limitations period); see also
Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing district court that granted govern-
ment's motion to dismiss without even hearing oral argument on the issue of concealment); Smith v.
Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (reversing district court's dismissal of plaintiff's allega-
tion of government concealment on motion to dismiss), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981). As the
Richards court noted:
There is an inherent problem in using a motion to dismiss for purposes of raising a statute of
limitations defense. Although it is true that a complaint sometimes discloses such defects on its
face, it is more likely that the plaintiff can raise factual setoffs to such an affirmative defense.
662 F.2d at 73. See generally Marcus, supra note 1, at 904 (arguing that courts should cease practice
of dismissing claims alleging fraudulent concealment on pleadings).
41. Lee, slip op. at 3 (civil rights action filed by former assistant to Dr. Martin Luther King
accrued not when illegal wiretapping was revealed in 1975 Senate report but in 1960's when the
"nation's leading newspapers were rife with accounts of buggings of Dr. King"); see also United
Klans of America v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs put on notice by press
reporting). But see Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 39 n.118 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (plaintiff's claim re-
mains alive if he did not read newspaper article that would have put him on notice), cert. denied sub
nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985).
42. See Hobson, 737 F.2d at 35, 36 (discussing standard and citing cases).
43. For example, in Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), the court barred a
Federal Tort Claims Act claim alleging that, as part of an effort to hinder plaintiff's political activi-
ties, FBI agents directed an agent provocateur to steal documents from plaintiff's garage and set the
garage on fire to cover his tracks. Plaintiff also alleged that the FBI further concealed its actions by
filing a fictitious account of the incident with the local fire department, blaming the fire on a negligent
marijuana-smoking teenager. Id. at 1343. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the limitations
period should have been tolled until she discovered the government's role in the wrongdoing. Rather
than treating the entire scheme as a self-concealing tort, see supra text accompanying notes 2-6, or
the fire and the phone call to the fire department as affirmative acts of concealment following the
original tort, see supra text accompanying notes 7-8, and tolling the limitations period until plaintiff
could bring a claim against particular defendants, the court treated the call as the only act of conceal-
ment. Id. at 1345. The court analyzed the fire under a medical malpractice accrual standard, holding
that the limitations period began to run almost immediately after the blaze was discovered; i.e., at the
point that plaintiff knew the fact of her injury (the lost garage) and its cause (the fire). Id. at 1344. In
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Application of the arm's length standard to government-citizen relation-
ships has been damaging as much for the confusion it has created as for
the injustices it has wrought. Faced with egregious acts of government
cover-up, federal courts, particularly at the circuit level, have found a va-
riety of ways to keep suits alive. A few courts have gone outside the pa-
rameters of equitable tolling doctrine in attempts to take account of the
government-citizen relationship.44 More often, however, courts have ap-
plied aspects of the trusted defendant standard under the rubric of the
arm's length doctrine. Thus, courts have reduced the diligence required of
plaintiffs alleging government cover-up.45 In addition, one court expanded
its definition of concealment to include denial,46 and at least two courts
have come close to imposing on government a duty of disclosure.
In Allen v. United States,47 a suit to recover damages for cancer and
leukemia allegedly caused by atomic testing in Nevada, the court noted
that the "clock of limitations could have started to run a long time ago had
the [government] but started it by imparting to the population at risk that
which it then knew or had reason-and real opportunity-to know and
which the plaintiffs are just now finding out."' 48 Similarly, in Hohri v.
its fraudulent concealment analysis, the court held that the fictitious report the FBI filed with the fire
department did not constitute concealment because evidence available immediately after the fire was
discovered suggested arson. Id. at 1345. For a discussion distinguishing accrual under medical mal-
practice from tolling under fraudulent concealment, see Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 249
n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
44. See Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1229-31 (7th Cir. 1984) (employing Wisconsin equi-
table estoppel doctrine to ensure a remedy for plaintiffs seeking redress for gross civil rights violations
by police officers); Saffron v. Wilson, 481 F. Supp. 228, 255 (D.D.C. 1979) (altering pleading and
discovery requirements for plaintiff alleging fraudulent concealment by the Secret Service). For a
discussion of why equitable estoppel is not an adequate substitute for the arm's length standard, see
infra note 105 and accompanying text.
45. See Liuzzo v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 1274, 1284 (E.D. Mich. 1980) ("activity that tends
to hide the participation of government related personnel in torts that occur in the course of their
duties may provide a longer time to those injured to make claims than would be true if other methods
were used").
46. See Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1191 n. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912
(1981) (defendant government officials' incorrect denial of allegations of wrongdoing made in press
and failure to inform Department of Justice of wiretap records that were relevant to related criminal
prosecution constituted fraudulent concealment). The basis of the Smith holding is unclear. First, it is
unclear whether the denial itself was sufficient to constitute concealment. Assuming that it was, the
court's reasoning remains a mystery. The court specifically rejected the possibility that fiduciary rela-
tions existed between the parties, id. at 1190, yet purported to follow "traditional" tolling doctrine.
Id. at 1191 n.44. The court's reasoning, however, is hardly traditional: The court drew an analogy
between the government's conduct in the case before it, and the cloak of secrecy that surrounded the
government's wrongdoing in Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Fitzgerald,
the court had held that the secretive nature of a tortious government investigation was an aggravating
factor in the court's decision to apply fraudulent concealment doctrine. Id. at 228. The Richards court
held that the government officials' acts in the case before it constituted the same type of "affirmative
acts" as had been perpetrated in Fitzgerald. However, while the secret nature of the actions in Fitz-
gerald conforms to the traditional model of the self-concealing tort, see supra text accompanying notes
2-6, the denial does not, see supra text accompanying note 17.
47. 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984).
48. Id. at 347 (footnote omitted).
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United States,49 a suit brought on behalf of the Japanese-Americans in-
terned in American concentration camps during World War II, the court
held that government concealment of the absence of military necessity for
the camps from the public and the Supreme Court tolled the limitations
period until "an authoritative statement by one of the political branches,
purporting to review the evidence when taken as a whole, could rebut the
presumption articulated in Korematsu.
' 50
Although these cases may signal a move away from strict application of
the arm's length standard, no court has done more than provide an incom-
plete and ad hoc response to problems with the standard.51 The Hohri
court went so far as to couple its holding with the caveat that the facts
before it were "sui generis," and its decision was "not the occasion to
establish a new rule to govern future cases." 5 Thus, although some courts
have refused to allow the plaintiffs before them to go without relief, by
failing to articulate a coherent standard they have left future plaintiffs
confronting government cover-up without adequate protection.
II. THE GOVERNMENT AS TRUSTED DEFENDANT
Citizen allegations of government concealment demand analysis under
the trusted defendant standard.53 From the totality of its political and le-
gal dealings with its citizens, government engenders a special respect from
and gains power over many citizens that should be reflected in the tolling
doctrine. Applying the trusted defendant standard to most government-
citizen relationships would give courts a principled way to respond to the
difficulties facing plaintiffs confronting government cover-up.
This Part will demonstrate that most government-citizen relationships
include all the attributes that have prompted courts to apply the trusted
defendant standard: trust," an imbalance of power,55 and the concealing
party's monopoly over information relating to its wrongdoing.5" It will
then discuss federal decisions recognizing that the relationship of trust be-
tween government and citizen imposes a special duty of honesty and dis-
49. 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
50. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 251. The court stopped short of imposing a full duty of disclosure, how-
ever, holding that Congress' creation of a commission to investigate the concentration camps rather
than the commission's subsequent findings was sufficient to start the limitations period. Id. at 253.
51. Even when circuit court panels agree to toll the limitations period, they can not always agree
why. See, e.g., Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1983) (three judge panel split three ways on
why limitations should be tolled in suit alleging massive cover-up by local government officials).
52. Hohri, 782 F.2d at 249.
53. This Note does not argue that all citizens alleging government concealment should be ana-
lyzed under the trusted defendant standard, nor that the standard should be restricted exclusively to
citizens. See infra note 104.
54. See supra note 25.
55. See supra note 26.
56. See supra note 27.
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closure on government and its officials. It will conclude by explaining how
the two courts that have considered and rejected the application of the
trusted defendant standard to government-citizen relationships have mis-
perceived the doctrine's scope and effect.
A. Common Law Factors
1. Trust in Government
While faith in government was eroded by Watergate and other scandals
in the early Seventies, recent polls show a resurgence of trust in govern-
ment57 and in government officers.58 No poll, of course, can gauge the
symbolic power of official action.59 The presumptive legality of govern-
ment action affects a citizen's readiness to suspect the government of
wrongdoing in a way that defies simple quantification. Citizens are de-
terred from bringing actions against the government by a complex and
subtle interplay among the legal, psychological, and political factors that
shape a citizen's perception of governmental authority."' Even a jaundiced
observer of government action can evince an enduring faith in government
honesty and forthrightness."'
57. When posed the question, "[h]ow much of the time do you think you can trust the government
in Washington to do what is right-just about always, most of the time, or only some time?," 53% of
Americans in 1984 answered "most of the time," as opposed to 23% in 1980, and 27% in 1978.
Center for Political Studies, American National Election Studies (1981-1985) (unpublished study) (on
file with author). See also Clymer, Americans in Poll View Government More Confidently, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1984, at Al, col. 4 (reporting results of study). American citizens place far greater
faith in government than do citizens of other Western democracies. See Dionne, Government Trust:
Less in West Europe Than in U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1986, at 20, col. 1 (polls show that 49% of
Americans trust government in Washington to do what is right all or most of time, and only seven
percent almost never trust it to do what is right, as opposed to far lower percentages in Western
Europe.). See generally Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L. J.
63, 95 n. 11(1985) (discussing personal nature of government-citizen relationship).
58. When asked the question, "[d]o you think that quite a few of the people running the govern-
ment are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?,"
64% of Americans in 1984 answered "not many" or "hardly any", as opposed to 49% in 1980 and
53% in 1978. Center for Political Studies, supra, note 57.
A recent Gallup poll designed to assess the "honesty and ethical standards" of various professions
found that policemen ranked seventh of the twenty occupations tested. In response to the question,
"Ih]ow would you rate the honesty and ethical standards of [policemen]-very high, high, average,low, or very low?," 47% of the respondents answered high or very high, 41% said average, and only
10% answered low or very low. San Francisco Chron., Aug. 16, 1985, at 30, col. 1.
59. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391-95
(1971) (describing unique and extraordinary power of government officials).
60. See Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 343 (D. Utah 1984) (victim of government
atomic testing believed that government would not conduct testing unless it knew it was safe); H.
BALL, JUSTICE DOWNWIND: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S ATOMIC TESTING PROGRAM 56 (1986)
(describing how Utah citizens' patriotism and faith in government inhibited their discovery that gov-
ernment atomic testing injured them); U.S. COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERN-
MENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE D-NIED 126 (1983) (social scientists believe that the Japa-
nese-Americans interned in concentration camps were deterred from bringing legal claims by
surprising super-patriotism they have labelled the "150% American Syndrome").
61. As one federal judge remarked upon discovering that government attorneys had committed
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2. An Imbalance of Power
The imbalance of power between individual citizens and the govern-
ment is obvious.62 The government's superior position in part springs
from its clear advantage in resources. Much of the government's power,
however, derives from its unique ability to coerce.
The expansion of the government's provisions of goods and services in
the last two decades has given the government greater leverage over many
citizens.6 3 A more dependent citizenry is more susceptible to government
coercion and less apt to challenge government action.
Even among citizens who do not rely on government programs, the
state's coercive power can greatly inhibit the accumulation of information.
At times this coercive power arises from the legal prerogatives the govern-
ment can bring to the litigation process. No other defendant, for example,
can threaten potentially adverse informants or witnesses with prosecu-
tion.6 4 Particularly on the local level, the government can exert sufficient
pressure to stifle the flow of information to an injured citizen.6 5
what he believed to be fraud upon his court in a trial over a quarter century earlier:
[I]t is quite true that judged by modern insights I took a somewhat pristine view at the original
trial of the general integrity of government officials .... I suppose that I shall continue to do
so, despite the buffetings of Watergate, these proceedings, and other current disclosures.
Bulloch v. United States, 95 F.R.D. 123, 143 (D. Utah 1982) (Christensen, J.) (government commit-
ted fraud on court in 1956 suit by concealing evidence relating to dangerousness of atomic testing),
rev'd, 721 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1983), affld en bane, 763 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied
106 S. Ct. 862 (1986). Those less intimate with litigation in the federal courts are likely to retain an
even greater continuing faith in government. See also Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 326 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("Today's average citizen would doubtless be appalled, but probably not surprised, to learn
that in the early 1950's, while conducting a chemical warfare experiment, the United States Army
used certain individuals as test subjects."), cert. denied sub nom. Cattell v. Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131
(1983).
62. This imbalance may be exaggerated in the concealment context. Those most apt to be the
victims of official concealment may be those least able to discover their claims. As Judge Weinstein
has observed:
[T]he law should take account of the fact that the people who bring these civil rights cases in
the federal courts often proceed pro se, are ignorant of the niceties of state and federal practice,
and lack the contacts with the legal profession that the more well-to-do and assured of our
society rely on to prevent having claims barred by the statute of limitations.
Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 1980) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).
63. The coercive power that attends government benefits can be great. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton,
529 F.2d 47, 49 (4th. Cir. 1975) (teenage mother told that continued receipt of welfare funds was
contingent on consent to reversible sterilization that turned out to be irreversible). See generally Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964) (discussing expansion of government programs).
64. See, e.g., Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600, 607 (10th Cir. 1983) (McKay, J., concurring) (local
officials sent two teenagers to state correctional school for failing to comply with malicious prosecu-
tion, and threatened to prosecute a third for perjury if he recanted government fabricated accusation);
Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 328 (2d Cir. 1982) (government threatened to prosecute ad-
verse witnesses under the Espionage Act in order to to cover up unauthorized chemical warfare test-
ing), cert. denied sub nom. Cattell v. Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983).
65. In Vest v. Bossard, 700 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1983), for example, a judge, prosecutor, county
attorney, and a probation officer wanted to force a local college professor out of town. First they
forced a probationary teenager to accuse him of sodomy. When despite the threat of prosecution for
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Even if they suspect government officials of wrongdoing, citizens may
be reluctant to make their suspicions known, fearing (sometimes quite
reasonably) that challenges to official wrongdoing will lead to retribution.
This is especially likely to be true on the local level, where the suspected
wrongdoer and the authority with whom one registers complaints may be
closely related if not one and the same. But even if the source of wrongdo-
ing is a distant federal government, plaintiffs may forestall inquiry out of
fear.6
3. The Government Monopoly on Information
The government's powers of coercion are supplemented by its ability to
keep material information secret. Unlike most defendants, the government
has legitimate justifications for secrecy that it can invoke for illegitimate
purposes. Only the government can thwart a civil suit for damages by
claiming it cannot disclose the identity of a witness because he is an in-
formant,8 7 or avoid a court's subpoena by claiming that disclosure would
endanger national security.68 State and local governments can make simi-
lar claims in connection with their police function.69
The difficulty of access to government information is compounded by
the fact that the government is often the only source of information about
events related to its wrongdoing. As a unique entity, often performing
tasks without competitors with whom its activities can be compared or
from whom information can be gleaned, the government has a special
perjury, the teenager recanted, the judge insisted that the accused professor plead guilty and spend six
months in the Veterans Hospital. To insure that the professor could not talk to the recanter, the
conspirators placed the teenager under police surveillance for five years. Id. at 607 (McKay, J.,
concurring).
66. To take an extreme but illustrative example, empirical evidence suggests that the Japanese-
Americans interned in concentration camps during World War II did not challenge the legitimacy of
the government's actions until long after they were released because they feared that such a challenge
would return them to captivity. S. FUKISHIMA & K. ITO, THE EFFECTS OF RELOCATION ON THE
MENTAL HEALTH OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS: EVALUATION OF THE LITERATURE AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, (presented to the United States Commission on Wartime Relocation, Papers of the Commis-
sion, Part 11 1983).
67. See Bergman v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1353, 1358-61 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (discussing
extent of privilege and citing cases).
68. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (request for informa-
tion); Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 328 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub noma. Cattell v.
Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983) (subpoena).
69. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (local police claimed law enforcement
considerations required them to keep information pertaining to alleged wrongdoing secret), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985); see also Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d
1205, 1216-22 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing cover-up by Milwaukee police).
While the government's initial obligation to disclose under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 8552 (1982), is certainly greater than the pre-discovery duties of a private liti-
gant, once the government has reason to believe it has no disclosure obligations under the Act, it may
be more bold than a private litigant in its refusals to disclose. State governments may follow a similar
strategy under state analogs of FOIA.
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ability to suppress information completely. For example, for years the
government was the only party capable of gathering and analyzing infor-
mation about the danger of the radioactive fallout from the atomic testing
it conducted over Nevada and the Marshall Islands.70 In both locations,
the government was reluctant to test radiation levels; the tests it did con-
duct were incomplete, negligently prepared, or falsely interpreted. 1 Had
the government been a private party, the plaintiffs not only would have
been more suspicious, but they also might have been able to seek assis-
tance from public authorities. 2
Finally, when information is technically available, even diligent plain-
tiffs may have difficulty obtaining it. Government information, particu-
larly data amassed by the federal government, is often distributed
throughout a vast bureaucracy, and available only to those who have the
time, money and expertise to locate it.73 While at least one court has ac-
knowledged that it "cannot impose an obligation on all citizens to initiate
a triennial request of the Government" to determine whether their rights
have been violated,74 another court suggested that the plaintiff's failure to
70. See Nitol v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 405, 410, 414 (1985) (discussing testing in Marshall
Islands); Bulloch v. United States, 95 F.R.D. 123, 144 (D. Utah 1982), rev'd, 721 F.2d 713, affld en
banc, 763 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 862 (1986) (discussing testing in
Nevada); H. BALL, supra note 60, at 129-30, 197-98 (same).
The range of information over which the government wields a monopoly is not limited to the tech-
nologically esoteric. For example, until classified evidence became public, only the government could
know whether the government believed there was a military necessity for the wartime relocation
camps. See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (tolling claim brought by Japa-
nese-Americans interned in American concentration camps during World War II). See generally P.
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983) (discussing government cover-up of information about military
necessity).
71. See cases cited supra note 70. See also STAFF OF HOUSE SUBcOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2D
SEss., "THE FORGOTTEN GUINEA PIGS": A REPORT ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF Low-LEvEL
RADIATION SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING PROGRAM CONDUCTED
BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 22 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE SuB-
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS] ("the government falsely interpreted and reported ra-
diation rates so as to give an inaccurate estimate of the hazards [and] knowingly disregarded evi-
dence"); H. BALL, supra note 60, at 130, 197-98 (discussing Nevada testing).
72. The government's superior ability to conceal information is subject to two important qualifica-
tions. First, government activity is likely to be subject to greater media scrutiny than is the activity of
a private party. Second, "government" is not monolithic. It is divided into at least three levels of
authority-federal, state, and local-each of which are separated again into as many as three indepen-
dent branches. Any of these governmental units might be able to assist a citizen concerned that a
different governmental unit had concealed evidence of wrongdoing. That said, it should be noted that
governmental units can use their superior ability to suppress information to keep data from the press
or other governmental units. For example, the Atomic Energy Commission kept information about the
danger of atomic testing in Nevada secret despite the efforts of local newspapers, local government
officials, and high-level employees of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW). See H. BALL, supra note 60 at 67-83 (local newspapers); HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVER-
SIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 71, at 6-7, 21 (state officials and HEW).
73. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 895-897 (discussing difficulty of obtaining government
information).
74. Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 912 (1981).
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submit an information request under federal and state freedom of infor-
mation acts started the limitations period.75 One court rejected as an "ag-
gravating factor" the fact that material government documents were dis-
persed in eighteen different archives in seven states."8
B. The Government-Citizen Relationship in Federal Court
1. The Intangible Rights Doctrine
Placing the government-citizen relationship within the trusted defen-
dant standard would not require a radical recharacterization of the gov-
ernment-citizen relationship. Indeed, analyzing government concealment
under the trusted defendant standard would comport with the Founder's
vision of the proper relationship between government and citizen. The
Lockean theory central to those who drafted the Constitution" envisioned
a government with a "fiduciary" duty to protect its citizens."
While the Founders' conception of the government-citizen relationship
has not been reflected consistently in the case law, 7  their view is reflected
in a line of criminal prosecutions strikingly analogous to the fraudulent
concealment context. In those prosecutions, federal courts have held gov-
ernment and quasi-government officials to a fiduciary duty that includes
the public's "intangible" right to the official's honest and faithful partici-
pation in government affairs.80 Under this doctrine, courts have imposed
75. Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351, 399 (D.N.J. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir.
1985).
76. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769, 791 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 782
F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
77. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBIC: 1776-1787, at 283, 289-90,
601 (1969) (discussing Locke's influence).
78. See J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 156, at 88 (T..Peardon ed. 1979) (1st.
ed. London 1690) (executive's power is "fiduciary trust" which citizens have "placed in him for the
safety of the people"); id. § 149, at 84 (government's legislative power is "fiduciary power" or "trust"
citizens have reposed); id. § 171, at 97 (people have "express or tacit trust" that power delegated to
government "shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property"); See also
Peardon, Introduction to J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, at xv (Locke believed
government owed fiduciary duty or duty of trust to people); see also Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d
227, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (the Founders "most certainly assumed that the leaders of this Republic
would act truthfully").
79. See Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) (no fiduciary relationship between
government officer and naturalized citizen).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 120-23 (2d Cir. 1982) (quasi-public
official violated mail fraud statute by taking private interest in public project and by failing to meet
affirmative duty to disclose material information surrounding his activities), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
913 (1983); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1358 (4th Cir.) (governor violated mail fraud
statute by failing to disclose material information surrounding his interest in public project, and offer-
ing deliberately misleading statement to public body), affd en banc in relevant part, 602 F.2d 653
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 374 (8th Cir. 1976)
(building commissioner's acceptance of kickbacks violated mail fraud statute by denying public's in-
tangible right to honest and faithful service); cf. Coffee, supra note 23, at 143 (criticizing above
decisions for turning mail fraud statute into "'Truth-in-Government' Act").
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upon a wide range of public officials a duty to disclose information about
their wrongdoing,"' and have held that failure to disclose breaches the
official's duty to the public.2 An official's concealment is actionable under
the mail fraud statute" and under the common law."4
These decisions amount to a criminalization of fraudulent concealment
when committed to further individual rather than "official" wrongdoing.
Indeed, the term "fraudulent concealment" has been used to describe these
offenses.8 5 The holdings are animated by the belief that the government
has a duty to be faithful to the trust that citizens have vested in it. As the
Second Circuit noted:
Justice Holmes once wrote that "[m]en must turn square corners
when they deal with the government." It requires little imaginative
leap to conclude that individuals who in reality or effect are the gov-
ernment owe a fiduciary duty to the citizenry. 6
It takes an equally small imaginative leap to recognize that this principle
is as applicable in the tolling context as it is in criminal prosecutions. If a
government officer's fraudulent concealment is sufficient to send him to
jail, government concealment should be sufficient to stop the statute of
limitations from running in a civil claim.
While no federal court has made this connection, the Supreme Court of
Illinois has applied the intangible-rights rationale in the tolling context.
In Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc.,87 the court applied the trusted
defendant standard in a case brought by the City of Chicago against an
alderman. The Court held that the alderman owed a fiduciary duty to the
city, and held that his failure to disclose wrongdoing constituted fraudu-
lent concealment, tolling the limitations period. 8
81. See Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 142 (Winter, J., dissenting) (the courts have brought "virtually all
participants in government and politics under the rubric fiduciary").
82. See, e.g., Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1363.
83. See cases cited supra note 80.
84. Mandel held:
a duty to disclose material information need not necessarily be based upon the existence of
some statute or regulation prescribing such a duty. Rather, the duty to disclose may exist
because of the relationship between the one possessing the material information and another
.... So far as relevant in this case, the Governor of the State of Maryland is trustee for the
citizens and the State of Maryland and thus owes the normal fiduciary duties of a trustee, e.g.,
honesty and loyalty.
591 F.2d at 1363.
85. Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1355.
86. Margiotta, 688 F.2d at 124 (citations omitted).
87. 78 Ill. 2d 555, 402 N.E.2d 181 (1980).
88. Id. at 563, 402 N.E.2d at 185 ("To hold that the City was obligated to search for the misfea-
sance of its duly elected public official, absent a prior indication of wrongdoing, would require it to
presume unfaithfulness on the part of its fiduciary.").
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2. The Trusted Defendant Standard in Federal Court
The two federal courts that have considered the argument that the
trusted defendant standard should be applied to government-citizen rela-
tionships both refused to depart from the arm's length standard.8" Neither
court, however, appears to have understood the range of relationships to
which the trusted defendant standard applies. The courts did not apply
the factors generally used to determine the tolling standard.90 Instead,
both courts apparently assumed that the trusted defendant standard ap-
plies only to strict fiduciary relationships 1 and based their holdings on
the grounds that the government is not the citizen's fiduciary.92
In both instances, the refusal to adopt the trusted defendant standard
seems animated by an unfounded fear that to do so would expose the
government to an expansive range of new duties and liabilities. 3 Both
89. Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769, 791-93 (D.D.C 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Barrett v. Hoffman, 521 F. Supp. 307, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. Cattel v. Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983). The Barrett holding was complicated, however, by the
fact that the court considered the duties that emanate from the government-citizen relationship in
conjunction with plaintiff's argument that those duties also emanate from the due process clause. Id.
at 314-15; see infra note 97 (discussing Barrett due process analysis).
Only in cases brought by Native Americans, to whom the government has a fiduciary duty imposed
by statute, have the courts wavered in their application of the arm's length standard. See, e.g.,
Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(tolling statute of limitations).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
91. Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 791; Barrett, 521 F. Supp. at 315. The Hohri court showed its lack of
understanding of the types of relationships subsumed under the trusted defendant standard by ad-
dressing the question of whether the government-citizen relationship affected the tolling decision in its
discussion of whether the government was liable for damages caused by an alleged breach of fiduciary
duty. 586 F. Supp. at 792-93.
92. Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 791-93; Barrett, 521 F. Supp. at 315; see also Smith v. Nixon, 606
F.2d 1183, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (commenting in dictum that no "formal" fiduciary relationship
existed between parties in Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1977), a middle level
Department of Defense employee and a White House official), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
As additional support for its decision, the Barrett court cited its finding that the government is
subject to the same discovery rules and civil sanctions as any other litigant in the federal courts. 521
F. Supp. at 315. As a basis for refusing to apply the trusted defendant standard this reasoning is
flawed for two reasons. First, the validity of the statement itself is undermined by the very case relied
upon by Barrett to support it: NAACP, Western Region v. Hodgson, 57 F.R.D. 81 (D.D.C. 1972).
That case recognized the specialness of the government in its holding that the "paramount interests of
the Government in having justice done between litigants in the federal courts militates in favor of
requiring great effort on its part to produce any documents relevant to a fair determination of this
litigation." Id. at 83 (quoting Freeman v. Seligson, 405 F.2d 1326, 1337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
Second, the court's reliance on discovery doctrine confuses the tolling decision's concern with events
before suit is filed with the rules governing actions after a suit is filed. Discovery doctrine is not
relevant to whether the trusted defendant standard is applicable. See supra text accompanying notes
25-26.
93. The Hohri court considered the tolling argument in the context of a damages claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. See supra note 91. The Barrett court considered the tolling argument in the context
of plaintiff's claim that the government had a constitutional obligation to disclose its wrongdoing, see
infra note 97, and that the cover-up should give rise to a cause of action for damages under the Fifth
Amendment. Barrett, 521 F. Supp. at 315.
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courts' rigid reliance on the arm's length standard resulted in reversal on
appeal, where the circuit courts, without addressing the question of which
tolling standard should be applied, found ways nominally under the arm's
length standard to reverse the trial courts' holdings."'
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THREATENED BY GOVERNMENT
CONCEALMENT
An important additional reason to analyze government cover-up under
the trusted defendant standard is that in many instances use of the arm's
length standard will deprive a litigant of his constitutionally protected
right of access to court. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,95 the Su-
preme Court held that a cause of action is a species of property under the
due process clause.' 6 Under the Logan analysis, government cover-up, by
depriving a citizen of his property interest in his cause of action, may
abridge his procedural right of access to court.
97
94. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (tolling limitations period under
arm's length doctrine); Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 330, 333 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing
summary judgment in favor of government under arm's length doctrine and due process analysis),
cert. denied sub. nom. Cattell v. Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983). For a discussion of courts' tendency
to keep claims alive by making ad hoc alterations in the arm's length doctrine, see supra text accom-
panying notes 44-52. For a discussion of the Barrett court's due process analysis, see infra note 97.
95. 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (Illinois procedure barring suit under state antidiscrimination statute
within limitations period violated constitutional right to due process).
96. Id. at 428.
97. The procedural due process argument suggested here is similar to that set forth in Note, The
Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96 HARv. L. REv.
1683, 1692-95 (1983) (statutes of repose governing toxic tort suits deprive plaintiffs of constitutional
right of access to court absent legislative quid pro quo).
Two additional constitutional theories support application of the trusted defendant standard to the
government. Both arguments proceed from the court's holding in Logan that a plaintiff has a constitu-
tionally significant property right in his cause of action. From this premise the first argument asserts
that government cover-up implicates constitutional rights in a way that concealment by other parties
does not. It concludes that the importance of safeguarding constitutional rights and applying uniform
constitutional standards, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), mandates that courts employ the trusted
defendant standard because it is the only standard that accurately and consistently reflects the difficul-
ties a plaintiff confronts when faced with government concealment. See supra text accompanying notes
53-76.
The second alternative is that government cover-up constitutes a deprivation of substantive due
process. This argument also can be based on Logan, which some commentators characterize as a
substantive due process case masquerading as a case about procedural rights. See, e.g., The Supreme
Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 62, 102-105 (1982). According to this line of reasoning, just
as Logan found that Illinois had taken Logan's constitutionally imbued property right by depriving
him of his right to sue under the state's antidiscrimination statute, so the government deprives a
citizen of his constitutional property right when it conceals his cause of action. This theory apparently
informed the decision in Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Cattell v. Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983), where the court held that plaintiffs could bring an action
under § 1983 to recover the difference between the money they had received in a settlement and the
money they would have recovered had government concealment not inhibited their ability to take full
advantage of the legal claims available to them. Id. at 331-33. The court's cursory treatment of this
issue, however, left the rationale and implications of its decision unclear. The major flaw in the
substantive due process argument is that it knows no bounds: It implies that each instance of govern-
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As the Logan court explained, the constitutional right of access to court
is premised on the principle that, "having made access to court an entitle-
ment or a necessity, the State may not deprive someone of that access
unless the balance of state and private interests favors the governmental
scheme." ' More specifically, the Court has held that a constitutional
right of access to court exists where, "absent a countervailing interest of
overriding significance," a plaintiff seeks to vindicate a fundamental right
and the court is the only forum in which that right can be vindicated.99
In the fraudulent concealment context, a constitutional right of access
could be asserted by a plaintiff who seeks to vindicate his fundamental
interest in personal security and bodily integrity 00 jeopardized by a con-
cealed government tort where redress outside the courtroom is unavaila-
ble.101 When government action threatens that fundamental interest and
the government can prove no overriding state interest, a constitutional
right of access should protect plaintiff's cause of action.
Logan and the access to court cases do not establish an exact formula
for deciding how the test balancing competing governmental and private
interests should be calculated. When a plaintiff alleges government con-
cealment, however, tolling doctrine itself provides the proper test. Consti-
tutional issues aside, the tolling decision always involves balancing com-
peting interests: The citizen's interest in holding the government
ment cover-up would toll the statute of limitations, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the
character of the plaintiff's relationship with the government.
98. Logan, 455 U.S. 430 n.5.
99. Id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971)). In Boddie, the court held that
a class of indigent women seeking to waive court fees in order to obtain divorces had a constitutional
right of access to court. The Boddie holding subsequently was clarified by United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973), in which the court held that in order to assert a constitutional right of access to court
a plaintiff must seek to vindicate a fundamental interest, and the state must have exclusive control
over the "adjustment of [the] legal relationship." Id. at 445. In Logan, the access to court cases were
presented as an "analogous method of analysis" in support of the Court's decision declaring unconsti-
tutional the Illinois procedure that denied plaintiff his right to bring suit under a state anti-
discrimination statute. Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 n.5.
100. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("Among the historic liberties. . . pro-
tected [by the Due Process Clause] was a right to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for,
unjustified intrusions on personal security."); see also id. at nn.41-42; Note, supra note 97, at 1693
(fundamental interest in personal security and bodily integrity threatened by statutes of repose for
toxic tort suits).
101. Few prospective litigants are able to secure a remedy outside the courtroom. Without a valid
remedy in court, an individual has no leverage with which to negotiate a private settlement. The only
remaining non-judicial forum in which the prospective litigant might secure relief is the legislature. It
is enormously difficult, however, to secure legislative relief for a specific injury sustained as a result of
government action. Even the citizens injured by government atomic testing in the 1950's, whose inju-
ries have been well-publicized, confirmed by a congressional report, and championed by state and
federal elected officials, have been unable to secure relief from Congress. H. BALL, supra note 60, at
130-32, 177 (discussing failed legislative attempts). Legislators "are wary of having a compensation
program turn into a continuing, disruptive, draining entitlement program for other groups in the
society who have also been injured and wrongfully killed due to government negligence." Id. at 177.
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responsible for its wrongdoing is weighed against the government's inter-
est in being free of stale claims."'2 The citizen's constitutional right of
access to court requires an adjustment in how the balance is struck. In a
case involving government concealment, the trusted defendant standard
provides the adjustment needed to take account of that constitutional di-
mension. To apply the arm's length test-in other words, not to adjust the
tolling standard-would ignore the constitutional issue. The balance
struck by the trusted defendant standard comports with the directive of the
constitutional test that "absent a countervailing interest of overriding sig-
nificance,"' ' a citizen should have access to a judicial forum in which to
assert his property right. In short, the trusted defendant standard test sat-
isfies the due process clause as well as traditional tolling principles.
IV. EMPLOYING THE TRUSTED DEFENDANT STANDARD
A. The Trusted Defendant Standard in Practice
Courts should account for the special relationship between government
and citizen and the citizen's right of access to court when assessing claims
of government cover-up. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence showing
that a plaintiff deals with the government at arm's length,1 'O courts should
apply the trusted defendant standard when assessing claims by citizens
alleging government cover-up. 1° The government should be under a duty
102. See supra text accompanying notes 1-11.
103. Logan, 455 U.S. at 430 n.5 (citation omitted) (stating test).
104. The trusted defendant standard should not automatically apply to all citizens alleging gov-
ernment concealment, nor should it be restricted to citizens. The standard has always found categori-
zations useful, but not dispositive. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. It is likely, however,
that the standard would apply to most government-citizen relationships, and would not apply to suits
not brought by individual citizens. The standard would be entirely inappropriate, for example, in the
context of commercial relations between a large corporation and the government. Corporations and
other large organizations simply do not have a relationship with government which inspires the kind
of trust required for application of the trusted defendant standard. In addition, while few organiza-
tions can match the resources of the federal government, most organizations will not suffer from the
same debilitating disadvantages that face a citizen trying to uncover government wrongdoing.
Among private citizens, too, the difficulty of uncovering government information will differ. Unlike
the government-business relationship, however, it should be presumed that the citizen's relationship
with the government places him at a grave disadvantage. For citizens for whom this is clearly not
true, the doctrine affords sufficient flexibility to deny application of the trusted defendant standard.
See supra text accompanying note 29 (discussing standard's flexibility).
While this distinction between citizens and corporations cannot be exact, in general it is consonant
with a presumption that parties who deal on a commercial basis are subject to a more exacting tolling
standard. See Developments, supra note 20, at 1217 (there is "an even stronger policy against requir-
ing the suspicious attitude of diligence exacted of persons dealing on a commercial basis").
105. For a more elaborate discussion of the theory and mechanics of the trusted defendant stan-
dard, see supra text accompanying notes 18-29. Another possible substitute for the arm's length doc-
trine is the doctrine of estoppel. One federal court has held that the government's concealment estops
it from raising a limitations defense. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1231 (7th Cir. 1984)
(applying Wisconsin law). Unlike the equitable tolling proposed in this Note, however, estoppel does
not provide a broadly applicable solution to the problem of government concealment. Estoppel is less
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to disclose its wrongdoing.1 " Its failure to disclose wrongdoing, or its false
denial of wrongdoing, should constitute fraudulent concealment, tolling
the statute of limitations. The limitations period should remain tolled un-
til the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the concealed cause of
action.1"' In the determination of when the citizen should have discovered
likely to find general approval, and would only apply to a limited spectrum of government conceal-
ment on a deliberately ad hoc basis.
While courts will toll actions against the government, see note 31 (citing cases), as a general princi-
ple courts are extremely reluctant to estop the government. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 17.01, at 491-92 (1958) ("courts usually hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel does
not apply to the government"); Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
551, 551 (1979) ("[tlraditionally, courts have not permitted estoppel of the government, no matter
how compelling the circumstances"); see also Heckler v. Community Health Services, 467 U.S. 51, 60
(1984) (Court is "hesitant. . . to say there are no cases" in which estoppel of government would be
appropriate) (emphasis omitted). The hostility to estoppel of government is based in large part on
tradition. K. DAVIS, supra, § 17.01, at 491. In addition, it has been argued that the general public
should not suffer for the misrepresentations or mistakes of its agents, and that estoppel of government,
by rendering the government incapable of enforcing the law, would undermine obedience to the rule
of law. See Community Health Services, 467 U.S. at 60; see also Note, supra, at 565-67 (possible
separation of powers problems involved in estoppel of government).
Another important advantage to the tolling approach is that whereas the doctrine of estoppel cannot
be used to assert a limitations defense in a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, tolling is proper.
See, e.g., Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769, 786 n.22 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Barrett v. Hoffman, 521 F. Supp. 307, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom. Cattell v. Barrett, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983). This is because the limitations period that governs the
FTCA claim requirement is jurisdictional, and parties cannot create jurisdiction by their actions.
Hohri, 586 F. Supp. at 786 n. 22; Barrett, 521 F. Supp. at 320 n. 17.
Finally, estoppel would only bar the government from asserting a limitations defense when it af-
firmatively denied or misrepresented its role in any wrongdoing. See Community Health Services, 467
U.S. at 59. The tolling approach advocated here also would apply to "self-concealing" torts. See supra
text accompanying notes 2-6. In addition, it would impose on government a duty of disclosure. See
infra text accompanying note 106.
106. See supra text accompanying note 20. It is important to emphasize that disclosure is not an
admission of liability; it simply provides the plaintiff with full information about government activities
in which he may have a direct interest. Obviously, if the government is intent on concealing informa-
tion, or if it feels that the costs of disclosure are too great, then the duty to disclose will become a
constructive duty, and will serve the purpose of tolling the limitations until a plaintiff knows or should
have known of any claim.
The nature of the wrongdoing and the number of citizens potentially at risk will affect the require-
ments of notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-45 (1950);
Spevack v. United States, 390 F.2d 977, 982-84 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (government had not put scientist on
notice of expropriation of his formula simply by declassifying evidence that they had used it, and
could only provide proper notice by making a public announcement reasonably calculated to get his
attention). The standard established by Spevack should govern the government's disclosure duties,
though it would be disingenuous to suggest that any standard of disclosure can do more than give
courts a guide to decisions that will turn on the particularized facts of individual cases.
107. The burden of proving due diligence has traditionally remained with the plaintiff, as the
party seeking to toll the limitations period. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1098
(10th Cir. 1984); see also Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissing
allegation of fraudulent concealment in part because plaintiff failed to allege due diligence). But see
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defendant has the burden of proving absence of
due diligence in the D.C. Circuit), cert. denied sub nom. Brennan v. Hobson, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985).
For this reason, and because the plaintiff is the party best able to bring evidence of his diligence
before the court, this Note advocates leaving the burden of proof with the plaintiff. The difficulties
facing a plaintiff confronting government concealment are better addressed through the less rigorous
standard of diligence required by the trusted defendant tolling standard.
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the government's malfeasance, the citizen should be under no duty to mis-
trust the government, or suspect it of wrongdoing. Finally, the application
of the trusted defendant standard should not alter the legal relationship
between government and citizen in any other way. Aside from determin-
ing when the limitations period begins to run, the trusted defendant stan-
dard should not impose on government any new duties, obligations, or
liabilities.108
B. Achieving Larger Goals
Applying the trusted defendant standard to citizen-government relation-
ships will not only more accurately assess when the limitations period
should run on a citizen's suit, but will serve larger social purposes as well.
On a practical level, by increasing the likelihood that the government and
its officers will be held accountable for their torts, application of the stan-
dard will deter government wrongdoing, help compensate victims of gov-
ernment cover-up, and spread the loss of any harm incurred.
More important, by compelling government disclosure and ceasing to
penalize citizens for their trust in government, the standard would
strengthen the relationship between government and citizen and foster
greater faith in government honesty and forthrightness. The law would
not only reflect the trust citizens place in government, but would en-
courage that trust.'09
Finally, holding government accountable for its wrongdoings preserves
the moral basis of the rule of law.110 As Justice Brandeis wrote:
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the Gov-
The government, however, should have the burden of going forward with evidence that it has dis-
closed information sufficient to put a plaintiff on notice of his claim; the government is clearly the
party best able to bring this evidence before the court. See, e.g., Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1191
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
108. Under the proposed change, the statute of limitations would remain "a defense separate from
the denial of breach of duty." United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979).
109. As Professor Dalton has written:
At its best, the connection between the people and their government is rather like a personal
relationship. It is built on mutual need, mutual trust, give and take, shared responsibilities,
and an irrational element that looks a lot like love. It is that relationship more than (or over
and above) fear of punishment that makes people law-abiding, loyal, patriotic, and optimistic.
I am convinced that the relationship is deepened whenever a government takes the people into
its confidence, levels with them, and trusts them to make hard choices. Certainly the converse
is true, as both Viet Nam and Watergate vividly demonstrate.
Dalton, supra note 57, at 95 n.111.
110. P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT-. CrrTzEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 23 (1983)
(discussing benefits of holding government liable for its torts).
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Government Cover-up
ernment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."1
When application of the arm's length standard allows the government to
plead the statute of limitations successfully, the government's legal victory
is society's loss. 11
2
CONCLUSION
The citizen's trust in government and the government's ability to.con-
ceal information create difficulties for the citizen that are not accounted
for in the arm's length tolling standard federal courts presently apply to
citizen allegations of government concealment. Analyzing citizen allega-
tions of government concealment" under the trusted defendant standard
will enable those courts that have been sensitive to the unique characteris-
tics of government concealment to ground their tolling decisions in an es-
tablished legal doctrine in a manner that will provide guidance for future
courts and remedies for future plaintiffs. It will also make those courts
previously strict in the application of concealment doctrine, or blind to the
peculiar factors involved in government cover-up, take notice of the diffi-
culties facing a plaintiff seeking to uncover government-held and con-
cealed information. The law should not only reflect citizen trust in gov-
ernment, but should encourage that trust by fostering government honesty
and forthrightness.
111. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112. Judge Jenkins, who presided over Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp 247 (D. Utah 1984),
in which the statute of limitations was tolled because government concealment prevented discovery of
injuries suffered as a result of government atomic testing, has expressed a similar idea. In cases like
Allen, he said, the question is never will the government "win or lose. The government always wins
when justice is done. . . ." See Jenkins, Remarks Before Joint Meeting, 10 UTAH B. J. 1, 4 (1982).
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